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Sunday, January 22, 2012
RTI: 20 Lakh embezzled in Aligarh Station of All India Radio

Saturday, March 5, 2011
SC’s Verdict on CVC gives RTI activists 10 Reasons to Cheer!
Friends,
We should cheer now! Thursday’s Supreme Court verdict annulling P J Thomas’s appointment as CVC gives nepotism a kick in the pants! This order contains instructions for ensuring transparent selections of constitutional authorities such as State & Central Information Commissioners, members of Human Rights Commission, Minorities Commission, etc. We can use these ‘legal gems’ in our letter-baazi, complaints, RTI applications & writ petitions.
In this copy of the SC judgment, these 10 directives are shown in the right margin in Red Roman Numerals: http://tinyurl.com/SC-sacks-
These are also listed below.
10 Directives for Transparent Selection:
I. High Courts must entertain when appointments are challenged. “We reiterate that Government is not accountable to the courts for the choice made but Government is accountable to the courts in respect of the lawfulness/legality of its decisions when impugned under the judicial review jurisdiction.”(Pg 52, Point 45)
II. Recommendation made without due procedure are null & void. “If a duty is cast under the proviso to Section 4(1) on the High Powered Committee (HPC) to recommend to the President the name of the selected candidate, the integrity of that decision making process is got to ensure that the powers are exercised for the purposes and in the manner envisaged by the said Act, otherwise such recommendation will have no existence in the eye of law.” (Page 2, point 2).
III. CVC is defined as an “Integrity Institution”. (The same definition may stretch to Information Commissions.) “In our opinion, CVC is an integrity institution. This is clear from the scope and ambit (including the functions of the Central Vigilance Commissioner) of the 2003 Act. It is an Institution which is statutorily created under the Act. It is to supervise vigilance administration. The 2003 Act provides for a mechanism by which the CVC retains control over CBI. That is the reason why it is given autonomy and insulation from external influences under the 2003 Act.” (Page 22, Point 26.)
IV. The key issue is Institutional Integrity, not Personal Integrity. “The constitution of CVC as a statutory body under Section 3 shows that CVC is an Institution. The key word is Institution. We are emphasizing the key word for the simple reason that in the present case the recommending authority (High Powered Committee) has gone by personal integrity of the officers empanelled and not by institutional integrity.” (Point 28, page 30)
V. Recommendation of Selection Committee must show a proper thought-process. “The word ‘recommendation’ in the proviso stands for an informed decision to be taken by the HPC on the basis of a consideration of relevant material keeping in mind the purpose, object and policy of the 2003 Act. As stated, the object and purpose of the 2003 Act is to have an integrity Institution like CVC which is in charge of vigilance administration and which constitutes an anti-corruption mechanism. In its functions, the CVC is similar to Election Commission, Comptroller and Auditor General, Parliamentary Committees etc. Thus, while making the recommendations, the service conditions of the candidate being a public servant or civil servant in the past is not the sole criteria.” (Point 28, page 31-32).
VI. The logic of decision-making process must be self-evident. “Appointment to the post of the Central Vigilance Commissioner must satisfy not only the eligibility criteria of the candidate but also the decision making process of the recommendation. The decision to recommend has got to be an informed decision keeping in mind the fact that CVC as an institution has to perform an important function of vigilance administration. (Point 33, page 36)
VII. The touchstone is Public Interest. “When institutional integrity is in question, the touchstone should be ‘public interest’ which has got to be taken into consideration by the HPC and in such cases the HPC may not insist upon proof ” (i.e. conclusive proof of the candidate being corrupt or ineligible.) “The point to be noted is that in the present case the entire emphasis has been placed by the CVC, the DoPT and the HPC only on the bio-data of the empanelled candidates. None of these authorities have looked at the matter from the larger perspective of institutional integrity including institutional competence and functioning of CVC. It is the independence and impartiality of the institution like CVC which has to be maintained and preserved in larger interest of the rule of law. While making recommendations, the HPC performs a statutory duty. Its duty is to recommend. While making recommendations, the criteria of the candidate being a public servant or a civil servant in the past is not the sole consideration. The HPC has to look at the record and take into consideration whether the candidate would or would not be able to function as a Central Vigilance Commissioner.” (Point 33, page 37)
VIII. Don’t consider only civil servants. “No reason has been given as to why in the present case the zone of consideration stood restricted only to the civil service.” (Point 55, page 68).
IX. Step-by-step instructions for selection procedure, incl. how list of candidates will be prepared (Point 55, pg 68 onwards):
(a) Record reasons, especially if there’s dissent. “As in the present case, if one Member of the Committee dissents that Member should give reasons for the dissent and if the majority disagrees with the dissent, the majority shall give reasons for overruling the dissent. This will bring about fairness-in-action. Since we have held that legality of the choice or selection is open to judicial review we are of the view that if the above methodology is followed transparency would emerge which would also maintain the integrity of the decisionmaking process.”
(b) Don’t restrict selection to civil servants. “In future, the zone of consideration should be in terms of Section 3(3) of the 2003 Act. It shall not be restricted to civil servants.”
(c) Impeccable integrity. “All the civil servants and other persons empanelled shall be outstanding civil servants or persons of impeccable integrity.”
(d) Rational criteria, recording of reasons. “The empanelment shall be carried out on the basis of rational criteria, which is to be reflected by recording of reasons and/or noting akin to reasons by the empanelling authority.”
(e) Fixing accountability for empanelment. “The empanelment shall be carried out by a person not below the rank of Secretary to the Government of India in the concerned Ministry.”
(f) Don’t withhold information. “The empanelling authority, while forwarding the names of the empanelled officers/persons, shall enclose complete information, material and data of the concerned officer/person, whether favourable or adverse. Nothing relevant or material should be withheld from the Selection Committee. It will not only be useful but would also serve larger public interest and enhance public confidence if the contemporaneous service record and acts of outstanding performance of the officer under consideration, even with adverse remarks is specifically brought to the notice of the Selection Committee. ”
(g) Transparent screening procedure. “The Selection Committee may adopt a fair and transparent process of consideration of the empanelled officers.”
X. A precedent is set for quashing of Commissioner’s appointment by court. No need for roundabout methods to remove CIC/SIC! “The impugned appointment of Shri P.J. Thomas as Central Vigilance Commissioner is quashed.” (Point 56, page 71)
Benefits from this Judgment:
A. HALF THE BATTLE IS WON FOR ARVIND KEJRIWAL’S SLP, WHICH WAS RECENTLY ADMITTED BY SUPREME COURT. The Special Leave Petition challenges non-transparent selection of Information Commissioners. Gist of Kejriwal’s petition: http://tinyurl.com/Kejriwals-
B. Details of many unfair appointments: http://tinyurl.com/
C. In 2010, Andhra Pradesh High Court and Tamil Nadu High Court admitted writ petitions filed by Madhav Vishnubhatta challenging the arbitrary selection of Chief State Information Commissioners. In Tamil Nadu, the Chief SIC was appointed by the CM’s selection committee, disregarding dissent expressed by opposition leader Jayalalitha.
D. THE CLEAN-UP WILL OPEN UP HUNDREDS OF POSTS AT CENTRAL AND STATE LEVELS. The government will have to consider ‘eminent citizens’ like you all for all such posts, as opposed to political chamchas: http://tinyurl.com/How-Babus-
Warm Regards,
Krish
98215 88114
Wednesday, November 17, 2010
Why is CBI, and not ACB, investigating Adarsh? A fresh development, some inconvenient questions
Mumbai, 16 Nov: Activist Santosh Daundkar and his lawyer Y P Singh today moved the Metropolitan Magistrate at Esplanade Court to direct Maharashtra Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) to register a First Information Report (FIR) against former IAS officer Ramanand Tiwari (currently State Information Commissioner) and other key players in the Adarsh scam. This is because their complaint to ACB did not result in an FIR being registered till date. As per the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC), FIR must be registered within 48 hours if cognizable offences are clearly made out in the complaint. The case will come up for hearing before the magistrate on December 1.
Y P Singh argues that CBI’s ongoing investigation is an effort to pull wool over citizens’ eyes and letting the main culprits slip away. “As per the CBI manual, where a larger number of State Government Officers and fewer Central Govt. officers are involved, the jurisdiction for investigating the offences rests with the State ACB. Also, why has no FIR been registered yet? Until FIR is registered, the law of the land does not empower any investigating agency to conduct meaningful investigations,” he says.
CIVIL SOCIETY ASKS SOME INCONVENIENT QUESTIONS:
A. HAS CBI REGISTERED AN FIR? IF SO, ARE SUSHIL KUMAR SHINDE, VILASRAO DESHMUKH AND ASHOK CHAVAN NAMED AS THE ACCUSED? One wonders whether by asking CBI to handle investigations, the Prime Minister is attempting to shield them. CBI is directly under Personnel Ministry/DOPT, which is a portfolio held by Dr Manmohan Singh himself. Also, until becoming the Chief Minister, Prithviraj Chavan was Minister of State for Persmin/DOPT.
B. IS CBI OUTSIDE ITS PROPER JURISDICTION? Look at CBI’s website (http://cbi.nic.in/aboutus/
BY CONTRAST, THE JURISDICTION OF ACB MAHARASHTRA IS BEYOND QUESTION. ACB’s website (http://acbmaharashtra.org/ ) states, “The Anti-Corruption Bureau has jurisdiction over the State of Maharashtra. Police Officers attached to the Bureau are competent to investigate cases against all public servants, irrespective of the fact whether the public servant concerned is under the control of the Central Government or of the State Government... However, there is a separate agency (i.e. the Central Bureau of Investigation) to deal with cases against Central Government Servants. Hence, to avoid duplication of work, the officers of the Bureau make enquiries and investigations into complaints only against servants of the State Government, of the statutory Corporations of Bodies set up and financed by the State Government...”
Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 ( http://www.box.net/shared/
C. CBI IS UNDER SUPERINTENDENCE OF CENTRAL VIGILANCE COMMISSION (CVC), WHICH HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER POLITICIANS. As per the CVC Act notified on 12.09.2003, the superintendence over CBI relating to investigation of offences alleged to have been committed under the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988, vests in Central Vigilance Commission. Even if we ignore the fact that the current CVC Mr P J Thomas is himself a tainted bureaucrat, how does one cope with the fact that CVC does not have jurisdiction over politicians, and that it merely forwards complaints against bureaucrats to the respective department heads to investigate and report back? These are critical deficiencies that have been pointed out by Karnataka Lokayukta Justice Santosh Hegde, former CVC P Shankar, senior Supreme Court advocate Prashant Bhushan and others.
Admittedly, the involvement of defense land and defense personnel – a central subject -- provides a fig-leaf of justification for CBI’s involvement. The question that we are asking Dr Manmohan Singh is: Mr Prime Minister, are you misusing your direct power over CBI for shielding your cabinet colleagues Sushil Kumar Shinde and Vilasrao Deshmukh?
Krish
98215 88114
Tuesday, September 14, 2010
Video: Mumbai Activists give Mock Sendoff to Chief Info Commissioner
These are the proceedings of the Mock Sendoff to the Chief Information Commissioner held on Thursday, 9th September, 2010 at Marathi Patrakar Sangh, Mumbai. The sendoff was to show the government what RTI appellants feel about the current batch of Information Commissioners, both in Maharashtra and at the Centre. Despite concerns about propriety, it is necessary and urgent to organize such protests in all towns to give the government something to think about, before they non-transparently appoint the next batch of Information Commissioners.
The Sendoff was held after a press conference organized by G R Vora, Krishnaraj Rao & friends. The press conference was held to highlight the connection between
a) murderous attacks on RTI activists and whistleblowers
b) arbitrary and non-transparent appointment of political stooges as Information Commissioners & Vigilance Commissioners.
Fellow activists, it should be our utmost priority to organize many such sendoff parties for existing Information Commissioners in many towns and villages in Sept-October ’10. We must send a clear message to the government that the era of nepotistic appointments is over.
For organizing details, read: http://www.box.net/shared/r91tch0s3g
If you want to organize this, please call me.
Regards,
Krish
09821588114
Tuesday, September 7, 2010
Whistleblowers’ Bill aims to victimize activists and spare politicians & their kin
Yesterday, when I analyzed the above-named Bill (to which I refer to as Whistleblower’s Bill or Act, or WBA), I got lost in the legalities and missed seeing its biggest faults. After thinking about it all day, and hearing the views of my fellow-activists, I realize that the WBA has its heart in the wrong place! The proposed legislation shows that the government – specifically DOPT and PMO -- is intent on (a) turning a deaf ear to messengers who want to convey bad news, and (b) set up a system for exposing, discrediting and in fact, endangering their lives (c) setting up a sustainable and legal-sounding procedure for achieving aims (a) and (b).
If WBA is passed in its present form, then:
1. The Central or State Vigilance Commissions (CVC or SVC) that are currently supposed to only investigate instances of government corruption will now demand identity proof from people who submit complaints to it. No matter what may the threat to your life, you cannot conceal your own identity; otherwise, no matter how large the public interest involved or the compelling nature of the documentary evidence that you submit, the case will be closed.
2. Currently, people who approach CVC or SVC to make a “public interest disclosure” are seen as friendly citizens helping the Vigilance Commissioners to do the job they are paid for i.e. investigate government corruption. But the WBA will change this, because public spirited citizens will now be termed as “complainants”, be more-or-less ordered to do the dangerous job of an investigating agency at their own risk to collect evidence to support their “allegations”. If they fail to do this, they may be branded as mala fide persons, be imprisoned for two years and get fined Rs 30,000.
3. There is a large distinction between a person who makes a “disclosure” and one who makes a “complaint”. A person who makes a voluntarily disclosure – internationally known as a whistle-blower -- is usually a disinterested person who has nothing to gain from making the disclosure, and indeed may be doing so at great personal risk, purely because of the public interest involved. As opposed to this, a complainant is usually someone who has personal reasons to oppose the activity being complained against, and maybe something to gain from preventing it. The WBA completely ignores this clear distinction.
4. The WBA seeks to pit this public spirited person (who may be a government employee or an outsider) against the head of the department or government organization complained against, even if his complaint is against a lower officer. In the course of the investigation, his identity will become known to not only several employees of the Vigilance Commission, but can possibly also be also be revealed by these employees to the head of the department being investigated. As this departmental head will have to prove that the corruption is happening in spite of his exercising due diligence, he may feel that he is under direct attack from the whistle-blower, and he may act out of hostility.
5. In an indirect way, the WBA directs this public spirited person to bypass or avoid all other forums for seeking justice and action against the corrupt, and lodge a complaint only with the CVC or SVC. If it is felt that by approaching the State Information Commission, the police, the Court, the media etc, the whistle-blower has “blown his cover”, then he will lose whatever little protection and confidentiality he is being offered under this Act.
6. As every common citizen would have experienced, corruption is a nebulous thing, and is both difficult and dangerous to clearly point a finger at. Corruption usually involves multiple players acting together without a formal arrangement on paper. Therefore, it is the job of the CVC to play a proactive role as an investigating agency or information gatherer, and not to play a passive role as a court of law asking for conclusive evidence. The WBA proposes to turn the CVC and SVC into a sort of passive court where each whistle-blower must struggle to prove his point. This violates several fundamental rights of the whistle-blower as a citizen.
7. In most instances of corruption, ministers, elected representatives, leaders of political parties, their close family members, business associates and friends collude with influential and moneyed builders, contractors, land mafias etc. In many cases, pliable public servants are the instruments rather than the doers. But the WBA seems to look at public servants as the main subject of complaints, and ignore all other players. This sort of approach is discouraging to whistleblowers.
However, a positive feature is that complaints under WBA may be made for all offences under Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 (See main features of this Act: http://www.box.net/shared/crs4l5bz7m ), which is a particularly well-drafted legislation. The provisions of PCA 1988 are applicable to a very wide range of persons, including members of the executive, judiciary, election commission and private individuals who participate in acts of corruption.
Now let us analyze the Whistleblower’s Act from a technical and legal perspective. The name of this Act indicates that it is intended to, firstly, facilitate Public Interest Disclosures and secondly, extend protection to the persons making Public Interest Disclosures.
The preamble says that the objectives are:
1) to establish a mechanism to receive complaints relating to disclosure on any allegation of corruption or wilful misuse of power or wilful misuse of discretion against any public servant
2) to inquire or cause an inquiry into such disclosure and to provide adequate safeguards against victimization of the person making such complaint and for matters connected therewith and incidental thereto.
Individual sections that are problematic:
i) The two central things -- “public interest” and “protection” -- are not even defined in the definitions i.e. Section 2. So nobody knows what exactly constitutes a “public interest disclosure”, and nobody knows how exactly what “protection” a person making such a disclosure is supposed to receive under this Act. Other than a vague promise of confidentiality and a threat to punish those betraying the whistle-blower’s identity, the Act promises no protection.
ii) The “person making public disclosure” mentioned in the title is defined in the narrowest possible sense as a mere “complainant”. Section 2(c) defines him/her as a person “who makes a complaint relating to disclosure under this Act”. Thus, the “person making public disclosure” against a larger systemic malaise is methodically demeaned to a mere “complainant” who is pointing a finger at a public servant, and he can then be legally victimised. The duty of probing the motives and background of the “complainant” is then cast upon the “competent authority” i.e. CVC or SVC as the case may be. So the competent authority is empowered to: Firstly, put the complainant’s identity under a scanner to comply with Sec 4(1)(a): Secondly, demand supporting documents and use its civil-court like powers to summon his attendance at hearings as per Sec 6, Thirdly, threaten to dismiss his complaint as being “frivolous” or “vexatious” or otherwise not worth investigating as per sec u/s 4(6) OR Finally, find the complainant guilty of false and misleading disclosure, and award up to two years imprisonment and up to Rs 30,000 fine as per Sec 16. In other words, the whistle-blower who approaches the Vigilance Commissioners to help him do his job, namely, clean up the system, must do so at the risk of being branded as a criminal! This is on top of other practical risks that whistle-blowers already face.
iii) Section 2(d) then defines disclosure essentially as a “complaint” that pertains to an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988, willful misuse of discretion that causes loss to the government, and commission of a criminal offence by a public servant. The WB does not explicitly say in any section to whom this complaint should be addressed, in order to be considered as a “complaint under this Act”. However, the definition of “competent authority” in Sec. 2(b) suggests that only direct complaints to Central and State Vigilance Commissions (CVC/SVC) will qualify for this definition.
iv) For all the above reasons, the Bill perversely gives direct protection to corrupt persons. Section 3(6) expressly disallows anonymous complaints and tip-offs, no matter what evidence the anonymous complainant may be provide. By laying restrictive conditions for complaining and receiving protection and by specifying deterrent penalties and imprisonment to complainants in the event that their complaint “fails”, the proposed Act deters whistle-blowers from making a complaint to Central or State Vigilance Commission.
v) Section 3 (1)(b) excludes from the scope of such complaints the police force, where abuse of discretionary powers routinely happens.
vi) Sec. 4(4) allows the CVC or SVC to disclose the complainant’s identity to the head of the department or organization where he may be working, and Sec. 4(5) shifts the onus of protecting his identity to this head. Worse still, after doing so, if the CVC or SVC is “of the opinion” that there are no “sufficient grounds” for proceeding with the enquiry, then, as per Sec 4(6), it shall close the matter. In such an eventuality, the whistle blower will be left exposed and in a deadly situation with no protection!
For more, read my recent analysis, especially the colour-coded table: http://www.box.net/shared/355pdqp704
Also see official release of this Bill with DoPT’s covering letter: http://www.box.net/shared/suqa2l3n3y
Please email your views to responses to vkvkutty@nic.in
Address letters to:
Shri V.K. Velukutty,
Deputy Secretary (V-Ill),
Department of Personnel and Training,
Room No. 10-8/11, North Block,
New Delhi-110001.
What is a whistleblower? How is a whistleblower different from a complainant or an informer? What is the need for legislation to protect whistleblowers? For answers to such questions, download this international paper: http://www.box.net/shared/2s4hee9blc
Warm Regards,
Krish
98215 88114
Tuesday, September 7, 2010
Monday, July 19, 2010
RTI Reply: Govt paid Singhvi Rs 48L to muzzle whistleblower
For complete news pl visit:
http://epaper.timesofindia.com/Daily/skins/TOINEW/navigator.asp?Daily=TOIBG&showST=true&login=default&pub=TOI